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I. INTRODUCTION
The California correctional system has mushroomed in size
and cost in the last fifteen years, and the growth shows no sign of
slowing down. From 1980 to 1995 the California prison population
increased more than fivefold from 23,511 to 131,000.' In 1980 one
out of every thousand Californians was in prison. By 1995 this
number had soared to nearly one out of 250.3 To accommodate
this increase, the state has built seventeen new prisons in the last
fifteen years-the largest prison construction program in Ameri-
can history.4 The number of employees working for the California
Department of Corrections (CDC) has nearly tripled in the past
ten years.5
The costs due to the increases in inmates, prisons, and guards
account for a substantial piece of the taxpayer pie, and the piece is
growing disturbingly fast. In 1980 the CDC accounted for 2% of
the total California budget.6 In 1995 California devoted nearly
10% of its total budget to the state's correctional system. 7 One
study projects that the amount will increase to 18% of the budget
by the year 2002.8 The growth of California's correctional system
1. See DANIEL C. CARSON, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE,
REFORMING THE PRISON INDUSTRY AUTHORITY 1 (1996) (for the 1995 figure);
CALIFORNIA ALMANAC 50 (James S. Fay ed., 6th ed. 1993) (for the 1980 figure).
2. The general population of California in 1980 was 23,511,000. See STATE OF
CALIFORNIA, CALIFORNIA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 1994, at 11 (1994).
3. By 1995 the state's population had reached 32 million. See Lynne Carrier,
Immigrant Population May Have Helped State Economy, Study Says, SAN DIEGO
DAILY TRANSCRIPT, May 23, 1995, at 1.
4. See Fox Butterfield, California Prison Costs Overshadow College Funding,
L.A. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 16, 1995, at N4.
5. See id.; Mary Lynne Vellinga, Guards Hit Jackpot with Overtime Pay,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 23, 1995, at A15.
6. See Butterfield, supra note 4, at N4; Vellinga, supra note 5, at A15.
7. See Butterfield, supra note 4, at N4.
8. See G. Pascal Zachary, Prison Boom in U.S. is Seen Taking Its Toll, WALL ST.
J. EUR., Oct. 2, 1995, at 4 (quoting a study from the Rand Institute). California
spends more on prisons than on higher education. See Butterfield, supra note 4, at
N4. In 1995 the state spent more on prisons than for its two university systems-
University of California and California State University. See id.
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has been described as "without precedent in the statistical record
of imprisonment in the Western world."9
A recidivism rate of 59% '--the percentage of released con-
victs who end up in prison again-is the locomotive of this run-
away train. Six out of every ten released inmates lack either the
skills or incentives to steer clear of crime. California's "three
strikes" law compounds the recidivism problem; under an in-
creased sentencing scheme, each time a repeat offender returns to
prison, that person faces a stiffer sentence.1 To brake the speed-
ing growth of the correctional system, the state must reduce the
recidivism rate. A decrease in the number of returning prisoners
would slow the demand for new prisons, more guards, and ex-
panded programs. Most significantly, a reduced recidivism rate
would result in a decrease in crime.
Among the various work and educational programs run by the
CDC,12 the Prison Industry Authority (PIA) offers a unique "real
world" experience to an inmate who can get training for a job out-
side prison. 3 Given this practical goal of releasing inmates with
marketable skills, the PIA is one of California's best bets for re-
ducing the recidivism rate. A recent study conducted by the Fed-
eral Bureau of Prisons concluded that inmates in work programs
9. John Jacobs, Study Questions Investment Return on State's Prisons, FRESNO
BEE, Aug. 15, 1995, at B5 (citing a scholarly study published by the California Policy
Seminar).
10. See A Proposal to Improve State's Prison Industry, S.F. CHRON., May 2, 1996,
at 6 (zone 1) [hereinafter Proposal].
11. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (West Supp. 1996). The law has many teeth,
all designed to escalate the sentences of repeat offenders. A "second strike" of-
fender who has a current felony conviction-including those that are not "serious"
or "violent"--receives a doubled sentence. See id. § 667(e)(1). A defendant found
guilty of a "third strike" must serve a minimum sentence of three times the term of
imprisonment provided for each current felony or twenty-five years. See id. §
667(e)(2)(A).
12. The CDC programs provide services and training to 56.7% of the total in-
mate population. See CARSON, supra note 1, at 5. The following is a list of the pro-
grams, the number of inmates assigned, and what percentage that number represents
of the total inmate population: support services, 38,152 or 30.1%; vocational educa-
tion, 10,849 or 8.6%; academic education, 10,557 or 8.3%; PIA, 6923 or 5.5%; con-
servation camps, 4158 or 3.3%; other, 789 or 0.6%; community work crews, 401 or
0.3%; and joint venture, 154 or 0.1%. See id. A prisoner's work obligation "may be
a full day of work, education, or other program activity, or a combination [thereof]."
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3040(a) (1996).
13. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 2801(b) (emphasizing that the PIA shall provide an
atmosphere that will enable prisoners to "acquire or improve effective work habits
and occupational skills").
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were 24% less likely to wind up back behind bars after an eight to
twelve year period than inmates sharing a similar education and
background who were not involved in work programs.1 4 Despite
being grounded in such a solid and sensible mission, however, both
internal and external problems hamper the PIA. Still, the PIA
does not need a complete overhaul.
This Comment examines the role of the PIA in the battle to
slow the expansion of California's correctional system. Part II dis-
cusses the mission of the PIA by examining theories behind im-
prisonment and prison work reform programs. Part III provides a
background of prison population growth in California as well as a
history of the PIA. Part IV considers the effects of pending state
legislation and recommends consideration of lessons learned from
programs in other states. Despite its shortcomings, the PIA has
the potential to permanently return skilled, hopeful convicts to
society. In light of California's budget crisis and the dangers of
prison overcrowding,15 the state must make a greater effort to
streamline and strengthen the PIA because the program may be
just the brakes the system needs.
II. OBJECTIVES OF PRISON WORK PROGRAMS
Incarceration as a means of dispensing criminal iustice gained
momentum in the United States in the late 1700s.6 With their
newfound freedom from England, Americans repudiated the Brit-
ish legacy of sanctions such as fines, whippings, mechanisms of
shame such as the stock and public cage, banishment, and the gal-
lows. 17 Americans believed that instead of punishment, they could
rehabilitate prisoners through silence, discipline, and labor.
Forcing convicts to work was common practice into the 1900s
when most of the nation's prisons were self-supporting." Inmates
constructed California's San Quentin and Folsom state prisons, for
14. See Leslie Helm, Factories with Fences: Oregon's Ambitious Prison Work
Program Is Being Scrutinized for Ways to Manage the Rising Cost of a Growing
Prison Population, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 5, 1997, at D1 (referencing the Bureau of Pris-
ons' study of 6000 inmates).
15. See infra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
16. See THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON 112, 114 (Norval Morris & David
J. Rothman eds., 1995) [hereinafter HISTORY OF THE PRISON].
17. See id.
18. See id. at 119, 122.
19. See Helm, supra note 14, at D1.
1749June 1997]
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example.2 Despite the long history.of prison labor, in 1929 Con-
gress passed the Hawes-Cooper Act which outlawed prison labor.2t
This law was a concession to union pressure during a period of
widespread unemployment.2 Chief Justice Warren E. Burger re-
versed this trend in the 1970s when he began calling for prisons to
become productive-"factories with fences," as he termed them.2
Despite his urging to loosen work regulations, manufacturers' as-
sociations and organized labor have stunted full-scale expansion of
prison work programs.24 They have argued that prison work pro-
grams constitute "unfair competition to labor and management."
' 5
Despite this opposition, California and most other states have cre-
ated some form of prison work programs.
The trend in criminal justice over the past fifteen years has
been to emphasize retributive rather than rehabilitative forms of
justice.2 Legislatures, however, have articulated other objectives
to advance the twin goals of reduced prison costs and recidivism
20. See id.
21. See Hawes-Cooper Act, ch. 79, 45 Stat. 1084 (1929) (codified as amended at
49 U.S.C. § 11507 (1995)).
22. See Helm, supra note 14, at D1.
23. See Warren E. Burger, More Warehouses, or Factories with Fences?, reprinted
in 8 NEW ENG. J. ON PRISON L. 111 (1982) (remarks delivered by Chief Justice Bur-
ger at the University of Nebraska in Lincoln, Nebraska, on December 16, 1981).
24. See HISTORY OF THE PRISON, supra note 16, at 246.
25. See id.
26. The essence of retribution is that society imprisons offenders because they
deserve punishment. See Jonathan M. Cowen, One Nation's "Gulag" Is Another Na-
tion's "Factory Within a Fence": Prison-Labor in the People's Republic of China and
the United States of America, 12 UCLA PAc. BASIN L.J. 190, 214 (1993). Generally,
this narrow viewpoint does not consider the consequences beyond such punishment.
See also George Fisher, The Birth of the Prison Retold, 104 YALE L.J. 1235, 1236
(1995) (commenting that the notion of rehabilitation is even "mocked" statutorily).
The court in United States v. Bergnan stated:
The court agrees that this defendant should not be sent to prison for
"rehabilitation." ... [T]his court shares the growing understanding that no
one should ever be sent to prison for rehabilitation. That is to say, nobody
who would not otherwise be locked up should suffer that fate on the incon-
gruous premise that it will be good for him or her. Imprisonment is pun-
ishment. Facing the simple reality should help us to be civilized.
United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 498-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see Compre-
hensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (1988) (directing the United
States Sentencing Commission to "insure that the [uniform sentencing] guidelines
reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence ... of imprisonment for the
purpose of rehabilitating the defendant"); see also James J. Misrahi, Factories with
Fences: An Analysis of the Prison Industry Enhancement Certification Program in
Historical Perspective, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 411, 411-12 (1996) (noting that the out-
come of this emphasis on retribution is an increase in spending on incarceration).
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rates.27
California has the authority to impose punishment on those
who are legally convicted of breaking its laws.28 In doing so, the
state may advance objectives that can be grouped into five catego-
ries: punitive, administrative, financial, rehabilitative, and re-
storative. Prioritizing and balancing these objectives is critical to
the success of a prison work program. Using examples from prison
work programs around the country, this section presents the theo-
ries that underlie these objectives and supplies the tools for analyz-
ing the PIA.
A. Punitive Objectives
By definition, penal codes are concerned with the punishment
of those who break the law.30 Californians have been vocal
about-and active in-issues of crime and punishment. In 1977,
for example, the legislature reinstituted the death penalty.31 In
27. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 2801 (declaring the legislature's intention
to establish self-sustaining prison industry programs and reintegrate released prison-
ers).
28. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 681 (West 1982).
29. See Cowen, supra note 26, at 214 (addressing the first four classifications and
contrasting U.S. prison labor to that in the People's Republic of China).
30. The word "penal" is derived from the Latin word for pain, "poena." THE
CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY 757 (7th ed. 1982).
31. Death penalty law-on both a state and national level-has had a tumultu-
ous history. California carried out the death penalty 502 times between 1851 and
1967. In February 1972 the California Supreme Court declared the death penalty
unconstitutional, holding that it violated the state constitution's ban on "cruel and
unusual punishment." See People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 656, 493 P.2d 880, 899,
100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 171 (1972). Four months later the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down death penalty statutes in all other states, finding that the statutes gave no
guidelines to jurors for imposing death. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40
(1972). But four years later the U.S. Supreme Court reinstated the constitutionality
of the death penalty with the caveat that judges and jurors who impose it must have
discretion. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976). See generally Facing
Death: The Numbers Behind the Ultimate Penalty, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1996, at B2
(Valley ed.) (summarizing the history of the death penalty).
Thirteen months later, in August 1977, the California Legislature passed a
new death penalty law. See generally id. (reviewing the history of capital punishment
in California). In August 1992 Robert Alton Harris was the first person executed
under the new law. He had spent 11 years on death row. See id. Today California
houses 435 inmates on death row. See Elizabeth Fernandez, Execution Rate May
Quicken 435 on Death Row, Most in Nation, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 25, 1996, at Al.
Since Harris's execution the state has carried out the death penalty twice. See id.
Over 3000 inmates sit on death row in the 37 states that have capital punish-
ment. See id. In California-as in all states-the lengthy appeals process creates a
bottleneck, which results in a growing list of inmates waiting on death row. See id.
June 19971 1751
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1994 voters passed Proposition 184, known as "The Three Strikes
Law. 32  This emphasis on punishment and retribution is also
prevalent throughout the country and has been a dominant theme
of criminal justice for the last fifteen years.33 Such a public call for
severe penal laws justifies the merits of prison work programs.
Forced imposition of work as punishment and as discipline satisfies
the public's demand that inmates not enjoy a "Holiday Inn" vaca-
tion.
The nature of prison work assignments varies greatly. Work
programs imposing hard labor serve as a means of physically pun-
ishing offenders. Chain gangs-perhaps the most notorious ex-
ample of hard labor in the U.S.3 -resurfaced briefly in Alabama in
1995 although the state abolished them a year later.3 ' Both rote
The average wait in California is 20 years, twice the average wait elsewhere in the
U.S. See id. The cost to the judicial system of reviewing these appeals is staggering;
"[o]ne study found it cost taxpayers an average of $329,000 more to try, convict and
sentence a defendant to death than ... to obtain a first-degree murder conviction
without a death sentence." The Long, Costly Path to the Death Penalty, THE PRESS
DEMOCRAT, Mar. 11, 1995, at B6.
Legislative efforts of the past few years in California have aimed to shorten
the time between a capital punishment sentence and the actual execution. In 1995
the United States Congress passed a crime bill that limits capital appeals and seeks to
increase the number of executions. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 1214) 944.
32. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1996); see supra note 11 and accompa-
nying text.
33. See Misrahi, supra note 26, at 411-12 (calling the shift to retributive schemes
of justice in the past 15 years a "significant revolution"); supra note 14 and accom-
panying text; see also Francis T. Cullen & Lawrence F. Travis, III, Work as an Ave-
nue of Prison Reform, 10 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 45, 47 (1984)
(commenting that "few among the American public are reluctant to apply stringent
criminal sanctions").
Michel Foucault wrote that punishment serves the dual purposes of satisfying
the public need for retribution and acting as a deterrent by impressing on the public
the severity of the penalty for breaking the law. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE
AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 110-12 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage
Books 1979). He commented that "[a] secret punishment is a punishment half
wasted." Id. at 111.
34. See Cowen, supra note 26, at 220 (citing national public opinion polls that
showed 87% of the U.S. general population favored "harsher sentences for those
convicted of crimes," and 83% felt that "the courts have been too easy in dealing
with criminals").
35. See Diane M. Hailer, Prison Industries: A Case for Partial Privatization, 2
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y, 479,482 n.16 (1986).
36. See Settlement Will Ban Alabama's Prison Chain Gangs, L.A. TIMES, June 21,
1996, at A14. "After Alabama revived the chain gangs last year, Florida, Arizona,
Wisconsin and Iowa all adopted forms of the work crews." Id. Alabama dropped
the program when officials realized that chaining prisoners together was inefficient
and unsafe. See id. Corrections Commissioner, Ron Jones, who heavily backed the
[Vol. 30:1747
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work and monotonous assignments reflect the idea of work as
punishment,37 as do low inmate wages. Inmates are often re-
quired to work and are charged with a disciplinary infraction for
refusal to work, furthering the work-as-punishment attitude.39
B. Administrative Objectives
The administrative objectives fueling prison work programs
encompass the advancement of efficientprison management and
the minimization of prison disturbances. Idleness spawns man-
agement difficulties since prisoners often use idle time counter-
productively.4' Requiring prisoners to work reduces the idleness of
prison life which, in turn, reduces the difficulties plaguing man-
agement. "Prison employment.., is used to help fill in the pris-
oner's day[,)" leading to a more satisfied, less violent inmate
population. Earning wages and having spending power reduce
the likelihood that prisoners will steal from one another.43 Illus-
trating these basic prison economics, one federal inmate told an in-
terviewer: "If I saw you with a big bag of commissary, and I'm not
able to go to the store, I'm going to take yours." 44 California, like
other states, statutorily requires forfeiture of earnings for viola-
tions of prison rules.4 By earning wages, inmates also develop astrong disincentive to violate the rules.
reintroduction of chain gangs, was demoted to warden of a state prison the month
after he announced his intention to put women in chain gangs as well. See id.
37. See Josephine R. Potuto, The Modern Prison: Let's Make It a Factory for
Change, 18 U. TOL. L. REy. 51, 54 (1986). In some prisons more interesting work is
assigned to well-behaved prisoners. See id. at 54 n.17; Cowen, supra note 26, at 220.
38. See Cowen, supra note 26, at 220; Potuto, supra note 37, at 54. Even low
wages, however, serve some positive purposes. See infra Part II.C.
39. See Potuto, supra note 37, at 54.
40. See Cowen, supra note 26, at 221-22.
41. See Potuto, supra note 37, at 55.
42. Id.
43. See 60 Minutes: Prison, Inc. (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 20, 1996) (on file
with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter 60 Minutes].
44. Id. The prisoner elaborates: "I might hit you on your head. I might snatch it
from you. I might wait till you leave out [sic] your cell and take it. You have an
abundance of that going on." Id. This prisoner is serving a life sentence for murder-
ing an FBI agent. See id.
45. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 2765 (West 1982).
When any prisoner shall wilfully violate the terms of his employment or
the rules and regulations of the Department of Corrections, the Director of
Corrections may in his discretion determine what portion of all moneys
earned by the prisoner shall be forfeited by the said prisoner and such for-
feiture shall be deposited in the State Treasury ....
June 1997] 1753
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In addition to reducing an inmate's idle time, work instills a
sense of satisfaction, thus minimizing the chance for violent con-
frontations that often serve as an emotional outlet.46 "The avail-
ability of opportunities [to work] ... will give inmates some reason
to conform.... [W]ork programs that furnish inmates with activ-
ity, wages, the chance for self-respect, and hence the desire to con-
form will ultimately best serve the pragmatic interests of those su-
pervising ..... 47 An inmate who works long days on a North
Carolina farm commented that "[w]hen you do this work, you can
get tired, and you go back in at night and go to sleep., 48 The sim-
ple fact that work exhausts an inmate may contribute to the de-
crease in violent outbursts.
C. Financial Objectives
Financial considerations provide another substantial motiva-
tion for the implementation of prison labor programs.49 Prison
maintenance costs consume an increasingly large portion of a
state's budget." Prison work programs can stave off that trend.
Chief Justice Warren Burger commented that paying for the con-
finement of prisoners is a "load [that] should be lightened, if not
taken off the backs of overburdened American taxpayers."'
'
5
1. Reducing the cost of the prison system
Running prisons costs hundreds of millions of dollars.52 Why
shouldn't prisons be the source of those millions instead? Prison
labor can generate revenue for the correctional system and for
other segments of the government as well. For instance, in Florida
46. See Cowen, supra note 26, at 222 (suggesting that prison labor gives inmates
a stake in "prison equilibrium").
47. Id. (quoting American penologist Ellen Shubart).
48. Edith Stanley, It's a Workaday World for N. Carolina Inmates, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 30, 1995, at A5 (This inmate is serving a sentence of natural life plus thirteen
years for kidnapping and rape.).
49. See Cowen, supra note 26, at 220-21 (noting that the "naked, exploitative
emphasis on the financial benefits of U.S. prison-labor [programs] during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century ultimately led to the enactment of various
state and federal controls on prisoner-made goods").
50. See supra Part I (noting that the increase in the prison population demands
the costly construction of new prisons and hiring of personnel).
51. Burger, supra note 23, at 119.
52. California's 1995 budget devoted $3.7 billion to the correctional system. See
Vellinga, supra note 5, at A15; discussion infra Part III.A (tracing the evolution of
the costs of the prison system to the state budget).
[Vol. 30:1747
MAKING PRISONS WORK
half of any earned surplus from the Florida Correctional Work
Program Trust Fund exceeding $5 million at the end of any fiscal
year is deposited into the state's General Revenue Fund. The
other half of the surplus can be utilized by the corrections depart-
ment for expansion and improvement of the correctional work
program.54
Currently, prisoners in work programs provide many of the
goods and services that keep prisons running. For example, most
states use inmate labor to construct prisons.5s Inmates do every-
thing from "virtually every aspect of a construction job, including
concrete casting, carpentry, plumbing and electrical work" to land-
scaping after the facility is completed.5 In California, prisoners
manufacture mattresses, cleaning materials, and metal products;
cut meat; process eggs; slaughter swine and poultry; upholster fur-
niture; roast coffee; and farm-all of which returns to California
58prisons for consumption.
Further, most inmates employed through the PIA are eligible
51to earn credits that reduce their prison terms. Some inmates can
earn as much as one day off their sentences for every day worked."
Work-credit programs also saves California money in two impor-
tant ways. Reduced prison terms directly reduce prison opera-
tional costs, which now average $21,375 annually per inmate.
53. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 946.31 (West 1996).
54. See id.
55. See Potuto, supra note 37, at 55 (referring to the universal use of prisoners in
"institutional maintenance" such as laundry, janitorial, and food services).
56. See Using Inmates to Build Prisons Said to Ease Costs, Teach Skills, CRIM.
JUST. NEWSL. (Nat'l Council on Crime & Delinq., Ann Arbor, Mich.), Sept. 15, 1987,
at 3, 3.
57. Id.
58. See Marc Lifsher, Waste Behind the Walls, ORANGE COUNTY REG., May 14,
1995, at 24. The Georgia Department of Corrections estimates that their compre-
hensive prison farming program saves the state $2 million each year by supplying the
correctional institutions with 58% of their food. See Farm Chores Keep Prisoners
Busy, Save State Money, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 15, 1992, at C3.
59. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 2933(a) (West Supp. 1997) ("For every six months of
full-time performance in a credit qualifying program, as designated by the director, a
prisoner shall be awarded worktime credit reductions from his or her term of con-
finement of six months.").
60. See id. Some of the most heinous offenders are ineligible for any work cred-
its. These include felony offenders who have been previously convicted two or more
times on charges brought and tried separately, and have served two or more separate
prison terms. See id. § 2933.5.
61. See CARSON, supra note 1, at 4. To some extent this savings is not realized
since 59% of offenders released early are imprisoned again. See infra note 102 and
June 1997] 1755
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Additionally, as the number of inmates who shorten their prison
terms through work credits increases, the demand for new prison
space decreases. 62 The CDC estimates that by 1998 it will exhaust
all available prison space.63 The cost for a new prison that houses
4400 inmates costs about $300 million64 Such a steep price tag
gives a bottom-line incentive to the CDC to enable as many in-
mates as possible the opportunity to earn work credits.
2. Other financial benefits of labor programs
Prison work programs fulfill several financial objectives in
addition to offsetting operational costs. They enable the state to
monitor the distribution of earnings, and help stimulate the private
sector. Paying wages to prison workers enables the state to dis-
tribute those earnings in ways that benefit society as well as the
inmate. For example, the state can make deductions for expenses
such as the prisoner's room and board, as well as state and federal
taxes. 65 The state can also send a portion of the earnings to victim
restitution proframs.6 Prisoners can provide financial support to
their families.6 Further, the state can withhold some money until
the prisoner's release. These last two options serve a particularly
important financial objective-they decrease the chance that re-
leased prisoners will resort to crime as a means of supporting
themselves and their families.6
Additionally, facilitating private industries' access to the
prison work force stimulates the private sector. 9 Private busi-
nesses that open work facilities within prisons or hire inmates to
work outside reap a number of specific benefits, which range from
the receipt of rent-free space to the ability to pay workers lower
accompanying text.
62. See CARSON, supra note 1, at 4.
63. See id.
64. See id. (assuming two inmates per cell).
65. See Potuto, supra note 37, at 62-63.
66. See id. at 62.
67. See id. (speculating that since some prisoner dependents are probably sup-
ported by state funds, this may reduce the drain on state welfare budgets-another
indirect financial benefit to the state due to prison work programs); cf. Smith v.
Alaska Dep't of Revenue, 790 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Alaska 1990) (holding that prisoners
cannot be credited with any money the state owes them for their labor until certain
disbursements have been made, "child support being the highest priority").
68. See discussion infra Part II.D.
69. See generally Cowen, supra note 26, at 221 (noting the benefits of access to a
work force that can meet the private sector's fluctuating production and service
needs).
[Vol. 30:1747
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wages. One report commented that businesses can get "the cream
of the crop from a pool of cheap prison labor, not to mention the
use of... [a] brand new air-conditioned factory space, rent free."70
A plastics manufacturing company owner enthused that inmates
"have a great work ethic. If they get out tomorrow I'd find them
jobs.... I work them 10 hours a day, seven days a week and they
love it, and there's a thousand other guys who'd line up for their
jobs."
,71
D. Rehabilitative Objectives
Rehabilitation is an effective way to realize a predominant
goal of most justice systems-reduction of recidivism rates.
72
Many released criminals resort to crime because they cannot earn
a living by legal means. By providing them with training and skills
while in prison, the corrections system may be able to divert some
of them from committing more crimes.7 Chief Justice Burger be-
lieved that society has an "obligation-a moral obligation-to do
whatever can reasonably be done to change [an imprisoned crimi-
nal] before he or she goes back into the stream of society." 74 The
Chief Justice emphasized that it is in everyone's best interest to
help released prisoners become better human beings who can cope
with life.75
Prison systems approach rehabilitation in two ways: through
employment and skills training, and through teaching good work
habits.76 As a group, prisoners lack many essential abilities that
produce success in the workplace.n Therefore, to be successful,
70. 60 Minutes, supra note 43.
71. Sandy Harrison, Inmate Work Plan Running in the Red, L.A. DAILY NEWS,
Mar. 27, 1995, at News-1. But see discussion infra Part II1.C.2 (reviewing the prob-
lems private employers face by using inmate labor).
72. See Potuto, supra note 37, at 56. A U.S. Bureau of Prisons study traced more
than 7000 inmates for one year after release and found that prison factories and ap-
prenticeship programs could lower the number of inmates sent back to prison by as
much as 35%. See Sharon LaFraniere, Study Cites Benefits of Prison Job Training,
WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 1992, at A21. But see id. (discussing another study conducted at
New York State University finding that the effect of prison work programs on re-
cidivism was insignificant; however, the professor who conducted the study told
prison researchers that the Bureau of Prisons' study was better designed).
73. See Potuto, supra note 37, at 56.
74. Burger, supra note 23, at 113.
75. See id. at 119. If prisoners who are released continue their "warfare with so-
ciety[,]" we are the losers. Id.
76. See Cowen, supra note 26, at 223; Potuto, supra note 37, at 56.
77. See Potuto, supra note 37, at 56-57. Many prisoners are illiterate with little or
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work programs must impart meaningful employment skills and
habits to prisoners. According to Chief Justice Burger, this means
"something a little more useful than stamping license places
[sic]." 78 If prisoners sense that work programs will not lead to fu-
ture employment opportunities, they will have no incentive to
participate actively in the work program and develop good work
habits."9
Besides acquiring skills and habits that increase chances of fu-
ture employment, working inmates acquire social and personal
competence. Released prisoners must believe that they can be
good workers and must have the ability to interact with fellow
workers. 0 Work programs help cultivate these abilities." A dis-
trict court judge emphasized these points in Laaman v. Hel-
gemoe.s2 He examined prisoners' working conditions at the New
Hampshire State Prison and cited experts who noted that lack of
work decreases prisoners' self-esteem and self-confidence and
"leads to degeneration. ' 3  The court's prison reform order in-
cluded a requirement that each prisoner be afforded the opportu-
nity to perform useful work. 4
E. Restorative Objectives
The essence of restorative justice is that crime affects people
besides the criminal, and the criminal has an obligation to make
no marketable training and skills. See id. (also noting that prisoners often cannot
follow directions, which constantly threatens disruption).
78. Michael Isikoff, Does Inmate Labor Work?, WASH. PosT, Nov. 12, 1990, at
Al (quoting Chief Justice Burger's 1990 comments made in response to a congres-
sional bill designed to restrict the federal prison industries program to four areas).
Many states have created joint programs enabling private employers to use a prison
facility and prison labor to run a business. See generally Hailer, supra note 35, at 496.
This "'real world' atmosphere ... [can] ease the prisoner's transition into society
upon release." Id.
79. See Potuto, supra note 37, at 59.
80. See Burger, supra note 23, at 116 (noting that inmates in general "lack self-
esteem.... are insecure .... [and] are at war with themselves as well as with soci-
ety").
81. See id.
82. 437 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.H. 1977).
83. Id. at 293.
84. See id. at 329. The California Constitution states that nothing in the inmate
labor programs section shall be interpreted as granting inmates a right to work. See
CAL. COnST. art. 14, § 5. Additionally, courts have repeatedly found that inmates do
not have a federal constitutional right to rehabilitative, recreational, or vocational
programs. See, e.g., Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1255 (9th Cir. 1982); Battle v.
Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 403 (10th Cir. 1977); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146,
1262 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Capps v. Atiyeh, 559 F. Supp. 894, 908 (D. Or. 1982).
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amends to those impacted by the crime.85 This quest for restora-
tion is compatible with elements of the other objectives. To satisfy
a restorative goal, prisoners
should have to repair the damage they caused, continue to
support their families, pay for their punishment. There is
all kinds of work they can do: work in emergency rooms,
drive senior citizens to hot meals, earn money to support
their families, and pay restitution. You can't do that sit-
ting behind bars.8
Joseph Lehman, Commissioner for Corrections in Maine, has been
an advocate of restorative justice for years. He commented:
With restorative justice, we hold offenders accountable
and make the victim the center of the criminal justice
process. The corrections system ought to first assess the
amount of coercive authority necessary to ensure public
safety, but once you've disposed of that, we can hold the
offender accountable, making him right the harm he has
done the victim and the community, in a punishment that
is as much as possible visible to the public and related to
the harm done.7
Prison work programs can be the foundation for repairing the
damage caused by crime-both to the victims and to the commu-
nity as a whole.
III. CALIFORNIA'S PRISON WORK PROGRAM
California locked up its 150,000th prisoner by the end of
1996-a state record for total prisoners incarcerated at one time.88
The CDC is the state agency responsible for the incarceration,
training, education, and care of adult felons and nonfelon narcotic
addicts. The CDC has calculated that the prison population
85. See Karen De Witt, Put Offenders to Work, Some Crime Experts Say, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 30, 1995, at A-28 (calling restorative justice a "spiritual
notion").
86. Id. (quoting Dan Tonkovich, head of the Sentencing Project and Justice Fel-
lowship branch in Pennsylvania, on how to treat nonviolent criminals).
87. Id.
88. See Dan Walters, Prisons: How Far Do We Go?, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 22,
1996, at A3.
89. See BUREAU OF STATE AUDITS, CALIFORNIA STATE AUDITOR, PRISON
INDUSTRY AUTHORITY: STATUTORY AND COST CONTROL PROBLEMS ADVERSELY
AFFECT THE STATE 1 (1996) [hereinafter AUDITOR REPORT].
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could more than double to 300,000 inmates over the next decade. °
Do Californians really want so many inmates behind bars? Are
they willing to pay the immense cost?
Some legislators are balking at any proposal for prison con-
struction and insisting on reforms in correctional policies.9 PIA
reforms could reduce the urgency to simply continue prison con-
struction.
A. A History of California's Prisons
California's prison system is large and growing rapidly. The
system has changed dramatically in the last decade both in size and
spending. The state has been incarcerating people at an extraordi-
nary pace; the inmate population grew more than 500% between
1980 and 1995 to 131,0002 In contrast, the average prison popu-
lation in the U.S. has increased by 300% since 1980.93 By 1995
California was operating thirty-two prisons94 and employing 22,000
correctional officers, almost three times the 7570 men and women
the CDC employed in 1985."5 This rapid growth in the correctional
system has necessitated large increases in the CDC budget. In
1980 the CDC accounted for 2%-$300 million-of California's
total budget.96 In 1995 California devoted 10%-$3.7 billion-of
its total budget to the state's correctional system. 7
The "three strikes" law continues to have a costly impact on
the correctional system. Craig Brown, undersecretary of the
Youth and Adult Correctional Agency, estimates that "three
strikes" will force the state to build fifteen more prisons by the
year 2000 at a cost of $4.5 billion." This will only maintain the cur-
rent standard of housing 82% more inmates than the prisons were
designed to hold,99 a number far higher than the national average.
By comparison, the Federal Bureau of Prisons operates at 126%
capacity, while state prison systems on average operate between
90. See Walters, supra note 88, at A3.
91. See id. (noting that Senate President Pro Tem Bill Lockyer has said that he
will not approve another prison bond issue until he sees reforms in construction
policies and correctional programs).
92. See CARSON, supra note 1, at 1.
93. See Zachary, supra note 8, at 4.
94. See AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 89, at 1-2.
95. See Vellinga, supra note 5, at A15.
96. See Butterfield, supra note 4, at N4; Vellinga, supra note 5, at A15.
97. See Vellinga, supra note 5, at A15.
98. See Butterfield, supra note 4, at N4.
99. See id.
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114% and 125% capacity.' °
A reduction in the recidivism rate would slow this speeding
train. The CDC states that its inmates have a 59% recidivism
rate' °' in contrast to a 50% rate in the federal prison system.10 2 The
state's "tough on crime" attitude is short-sighted when its only
goal is to lock up criminals. Why aren't tax dollars being used to
fund programs that would cut the expense of housing, feeding, and
treating so many criminals? As former Governor George Deuk-
mejian opined, "I find it cruelly ironic that hard-working Califor-
nians who are crime victims have to subsidize the criminals who
committed the crimes against them."0 3
California must take serious, effective steps to usher out of its
prisons men and women who have a chance at leading law-abiding
lives. The PIA program represents an innovative opportunity to
achieve this goal.
B. The Background of the Prison Industry Authority
By statute all prisoners are required to work as prescribed by
the Director of Corrections.' 4 The Correctional Industries Com-
100. See Larry Williams, Nation's Prisons Bursting at the Seams, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Aug. 19, 1996, at A-2.
101. See Proposal, supra note 10, at 6. Though the calculation is simple to do,
thinking of this number as six out of every ten released prisoners will wind up back
in prison is a stark way to illustrate the problem with the system.
102. See Scott Ticer, Jails Are Jammed, Spending Is Soaring-So States Are Being
Forced to Experiment, Bus. WK., May 8, 1989, at 80. Texas has a recidivism rate of
43%. See Mike Ward, State Corrections Proposal Looks to the Past, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Sept. 6, 1996, at Al. Florida's recidivism rate is 51%. See CARSON, su-
pra note 1, at 16. Ohio has a recidivism rate of 34.4%. See Jodi Nirode & Alan
Johnson, Celeste Clemencies Revisited; Recidivism Rate Low, But Ex-Governor's Ac-
tions Still Troubling to Some, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 28, 1996, at Al. Surpris-
ingly, some states, such as West Virginia, do not keep records of recidivism rates.
See W. VA. Needs a Better System for Keeping Track, CHARLESTON GAZETTE &
DAILY MAIL, Nov. 14, 1995, at A4.
103. Harrison, supra note 71, at News-1.
104. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 2700 (West 1982) (stating that "[t]he Department of
Corrections shall require of every able-bodied prisoner imprisoned in any state
prison as many hours of faithful labor in each day and every day during his term of
imprisonment as shall be prescribed"). The Eighth Amendment of the Federal Con-
stitution serves as the outer perimeter of what can be prescribed. See U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII, § 1 (prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment). Prison labor violates
the Eighth Amendment when inmates are forced to perform physical labor that "(1)
causes undue pain; or (2) endangers the prisoner's life or health; or (3) exceeds the
prisoner's physical capacity." Toombs v. Hicks, 773 F.2d 995, 997 (8th Cir. 1985)
(compelling an inmate with an arm injury to work on a "two-handed hoe squad" may
entitle inmate to a claim). A court may also consider such factors as the number of
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mission (Commission), the precursor to the PIA, was established
in 1947 to run prison industries and was directly administered by
the CDC.'0 5 In the 1981-1982 fiscal year, the Commission gener-
ated about $26.7 million in sales and employed 2300 prisoners. 6
Despite these gains, however, the state legislature determined that
the Commission needed revamping.'O° The legislature felt that the
program had "failed to provide productive jobs to prisoners, to
meaningfully affect the cost of running the prison system, or to re-
duce the idleness and underemployment which [were] rampant in
California's prisons.' '0 8 Thus, the PIA was born in 1983 to replace
the Commission and improve various enterprises employing in-
mates. 'O Among the various vocational and educational programs
administered by the CDC, the PIA enterprises are unique. The
PIA enterprises offer "real world" work experience that prepares
inmates for outside employment after release."0
1. The mission
Both the text of the statute creating and defining the PIA and
the statement of the legislature's intent elucidate the goals of the
PIA."' These goals are: (1) financial-maintenance of profitable
enterprises; operation of a financially self-sufficient organization
that provides goods, and services to other state agencies, thereby
reducing general governmental costs; (2) administrative-
reduction of idleness and therefore a decrease in prison violence;
(3) rehabilitative--creation of a close relationship with private in-
dustry, which will provide an opportunity for prisoners to work,
hours worked per day and the type of labor performed. See Howard v. King, 707
F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that inmates stated a cause of action when they
alleged that they had been forced to work a total of 56 hours, seven days per week in
a field for over a year and had been deprived of proper rest); see also Jackson v.
Cain, 864 F.2d 1235, 1239, 1247 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that defendant's 47 days
working "in a barn shoveling unshucked corn that was over a year old and contami-
nated with rats' nests, insects, and clods of white, sandy dust[;]" working unmasked
and covered with corn dust; and pushing an iron wagon approximately 80 feet ten
times each day constituted a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment).
105. See CARSON, supra note 1, at 2.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 1. The Commission was subsequently abolished. See id. at 2.
110. See generally id. at 11 (noting that academic studies of correctional work pro-
grams have indicated that effective programs can reduce the recidivism rate which
implies that inmates are better prepared for outside employment).
111. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 2801 (West Supp. 1996).
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earn money, and acquire or improve work habits and occupational
skills; and (4) restorative-reduction in the tax burden on state
citizens to support such a large system.
112
A change in the PIA's mission heavily impacted the original
design of the work program.' In 1982 the CDC and PIA estab-
lished a goal of 42% employment of prison inmates in PIA pro-
grams. This goal was never realized.' Consequently, it aban-
doned the goal entirely."16  Yet, the CDC currently has an
abundance of idle workers; it counts approximately 15,000 eligible
who are not in PIA programs. These prisoners are not earning
work-credits that would reduce their prison terms."' Therefore,
the pressure to start construction of new facilities is heightened.
2. The board of directors
An eleven-member board of directors, the Prison Industry
Board (Board), runs the PIA."9 The Board includes the Director
of Corrections, the Director of the Department of General Serv-
ices, the Secretary of the Trade and Commerce Agency, two
members of the public appointed by the Speaker of the Assembly,
two members appointed by the Senate Rules Committee, two or-
ganized labor representatives appointed by the Governor, and two
representatives of industry also appointed by the Governor.' 20 The
Director of Corrections chairs the Board.
2 '
The Board assumes many duties and has powers similar to the
board of a private business. These include entering into contracts
and leases, ensuring fiscal responsibility,2' hiring and overseeing
112. See id.
113. See CARSON, supra note 1, at 10.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 10-11. The CDC, however, has closed the inmate-job gap for over
60,000 inmates through academic education, vocational education, and support
services assignments. See id. at 5 fig.3 (listing that 10,557 inmates are involved in
academic education; 10,849 are involved with vocational education; and 38,152 are
involved in support services). But these cannot replicate the unique "real life" ex-
perience that the PIA enterprises provide to inmates. Hence the chances of inmates
learning useful skills and habits are reduced. See id. at 11-12.
118. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
119. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 2802.
120. See id.
121. See id. § 2803.
122. See id. § 2808(a).
123. See id. § 2808(b).
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a general manager,24 evaluating and changing business ventures to
meet the PIA's mission," sponsoring public hearings on issues of
unfair competition,126 and determining prices of the goods and
services offered by the PIA.'27 The Board may offer its civilian
personnel incentives based on productivity and profit-sharing
plans.'2
3. Products and services of the PIA
The PIA employs about 7000 inmates-5.3% of the prison
population-as well as 674 state staff.2 9 They work at a variety of
small to midsize businesses such as farms, factories, laundries, den-
tal and optical labs, and printing shops."' The PIA runs a total of
seventy-three facilities at twenty-three of the state's thirty-one
prisons.'3 ' A number of state laws dictate which markets the PIA
may sell into; for the most part, only persons residing in state-
operated institutions may purchase goods produced or manufac-
tured in state prisons.1 2 Additionally, state law generally requires
that state agencies purchase from the PIA.'33
Both the quality and price of PIA goods and services have
prompted criticism. In a study commissioned by the state, the ac-
counting firm of Ernst & Young found that 71% of the PIA's larg-
124. See id. § 2808(e). The statute requires that the Board hire a general manager
with "wide and successful experience with a productive enterprise" and "a demon-
strated appreciation of the problems associated with prison management." Id.
125. See id. § 2808(h) (noting that they include operating a self-sufficient organi-
zation, providing as much employment as possible for inmates, and providing diver-
sified work to minimize deleterious impacts on state private industry).
126. See id. § 2808(i).
127. See id. § 28080).
128. See id. § 2809.
129. See CARSON, supra note 1, at 1.
130. See id. at 1, 3 fig.2.
131. See Stephen Green, Prisoner Work Program Needs Reform, Report Says,
SACRAMENTO BEE, May 1, 1996, at A3; CARSON, supra note 1, at 1.
132. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 2807(b). This includes any county, city, district, or
political subdivision, or any agency of these divisions. See id. The state also permits
sales to private parties in other countries, but this market has not been exploited.
See CARSON, supra note 1, at 3.
133. See CARSON, supra note 1, at 3-4. Accounting for about 56% of sales during
1994 and 1995, the California Department of Corrections is certainly the largest con-
sumer of such goods and services as inmate clothing, prison furniture, laundry serv-
ices, and agricultural produce used for prison meals. See id. at 4. The Health and
Welfare Agency is the second largest customer, primarily purchasing eyeglasses for
Medi-Cal patients. See id. The Department of Motor Vehicles-the third largest
purchaser-buys license plates, signs, and specialty printing. See id.
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est customers are "particularly upset by long delivery times and
higher prices."' 34 The auditors report that the PIA inflates costs
for products that earn a profit in order to subsidize those that can-
not make a profit. 135 The auditors also point out that many inmates
are trained "in fields with a labor surplus, which utilize outmoded
equipment and production techniques, or require licenses that are
difficult for convicted felons to obtain." '136 According to the audi-
tors, this kind of training reflects a lack of true effort to meet the
PIA's goals.3 7
4. The PIA's fiscal performance
In the spring of 1996, the Legislative Analyst's Office (LAO)
issued a report on the PIA's fiscal performance.'38 The LAO
found that, although the PIA's financial performance has im-
proved significantly, the state has received little direct financial re-
turn from its investment in the PIA.39
In the 1995-1996 fiscal year, the PIA made a $10 million profit
on sales exceeding $152 million. 4' Additionally, it has been
building up a substantial cash reserve and paying off its debts.41
As a result, the PIA's financial status has significantly improved
because it can reduce future borrowing expenses by dipping into
this reserve.'42 This has the added benefit of boosting the PIA's
annual net income. 43
The LAO attributes the increase in the PIA's productivity to
134. AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 89, at S-3.
135. The auditors contend that this means the PIA has failed in its legal mandate
to reduce costs for state agencies. See id. at 1-8, 1-17 to 1-20.
136. Id. at 1-8.
137. See id; supra Part II for a discussion of the five goals: punitive, administra-
tive, financial, rehabilitative, and restorative.
138. See CARSON, supra note 1.
139. See id. at 6 fig.4.
140. See id. at 1. Profit is income after the cost of goods, sales, and administrative
expenditures have been deducted. See id. at 6. The LAO report projects the profit
for the 1995-1996 fiscal year to be about $5 million. See id.
141. See id. at 6-7. As of June 30, 1995, the cash reserves had reached $30.3 mil-
lion and were projected to exceed $33 million by June 30, 1996. See id. at 6. This is a
noticeable improvement over the year-end cash balance throughout the 1980s, which
never exceeded $6.1 million. See id. The PIA has been aggressively paying off its
long-term debts, and the debt had been reduced to $3.6 million as of June 30, 1995.
Moreover, the PIA's February 1995 payment of $4.5 million was made ahead of
schedule. See id. at 7.
142. See id. at 7.
143. See id.
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an increase in purchases from state agencies that are enjoying an
improved state economy.' 44 The CDC, in particular, is placing
larger orders for goods like PIA-made clothing to meet the needs
of the rapidly growing inmate population' 45 The state can expect
further financial growth in the PIA as the organization pays off
start-up costs and recoups its losses from various poor investment
decisions!" 5
Despite strong financial improvement, the PIA's net income
statement inflates its true financial performance. The statement
fails to reflect large state subsidies for capital outlays, below-
market rents, workers' compensation, benefits for inmates, costs of
guarding workers, and the premium paid by other state agencies
for the purchase of prison-made goods. 47 Aside from several in-
terest-free loans to the state from the PIA-controlled Prison Indus-
try Revolving Fund, the state has received no direct financial re-
turn on its $91 million PIA investment to date. 14' Although any
surplus PIA money must be transferred to the state General Fund,
the PIA has never made such a transfer.149 Continued subsidies
from the state are inconsistent with the PIA's goal of self-
sufficiency.
In contrast to the big picture of debatable financial success,
from an inmate's perspective the program can come close to ensur-
ing individual financial stability in the future. Prisoners employed
by the PIA recognize their good fortune in procuring a job that
will help them upon release. Although the prisoners do not earn
much on a hourly basis-about fifty cents per hour"--many are
grateful for the opportunity to learn managerial skills.' One in-
mate, a foreman of an upholstery shop, plans to manage a stadium
144. See id.
145. See id.
146, See id.
147. See id. at 8.
148. See id. at 9.
149. See id. at 10.
150, The Board sets wages for employees. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 2811. The
highest paid laborers are firefighters, who earn 95 cents per hour. See Proposal, su-
pra note 10, at 6. The cap on how much an inmate can earn is half minimum wage.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 2811. The Ninth Circuit held that inmates are not entitled
to minimum wage and therefore dismissed suits filed by 79 current and former Cali-
fornia inmates who contended that they were employees of the CDC and therefore
entitled to the federal minimum wage of $4.25. See Burleson v. California, 83 F.3d
311, 312 (9th Cir. 1996). The court found that inmates' labor "belongs" to the cor-
rections department. See id. at 315.
151. See Lifsher, supra note 58, at 24.
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concession stand and tend bar upon his release. 2 In the mean-
time, he is rushing to train a replacement so that his departure will
not adversely affect production. 3 A coworker commented that
many inmates "come here not knowing if they can do it, and when
they learn, they do pretty good."'"4 He added that skilled uphol-
sterers earn between ten and fifteen dollars an hour on the out-
side.' 5
C. Problems with the PIA and Recommendations
The PIA is an important effort by the state to attack the stag-
gering expense of running the country's largest state prison system
and to prepare its inmates to lead law-abiding lives. Nevertheless,
the state must address a number of problems in order to maximize
the PIA's potential to earn revenue and reduce recidivism. Cer-
tainly, the PIA has been hobbled by a political, economic, and cor-
rectional environment which has changed drastically since the in-
ception of the PIA.'56 Stricter sentencing laws have resulted in a
prison population that has more than quintupled since 1983.' 57 In
addition, the 1990s marked the demise of a flush economy and the
beginning of hefty fiscal constraints. Meanwhile, the state's eco-
nomic base has shifted from manufacturing to more diverse, serv-
ice-based businesses.159  Though the PIA responded to these
changes with some administrative changes in operation, the state
has made no changes in the statutory framework.
60
Numerous improvements are necessary for the state to realize
its goals. California can learn valuable lessons from other states,
as well as from the federal government.
1. The PIA must develop and pursue a clear mission
A clear mission will enable the PIA management to prioritize
its objectives and devote resources to them accordingly. The
change in management philosophy since 1982 accounts for a dis-
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. See CARSON, supra note 1, at 12, 14.
157. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
158. See CARSON, supra note 1, at 7.
159. See id. at 15.
160. See, e.g., id. at 16.
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tracting, shifting emphasis on various objectives.' Whereas the
PIA concentrated on maximizing employment in the 1980s, it has
shifted to productivity and improved customer satisfaction in the
1990S.
16 2
Training and utilizing inmates for labor can further all of the
PIA's statutory objectives: increasing financial revenue, teaching
usable skills, and filling prisoners' idle time.163 Yet striving for one
goal may require the exclusion of another. The PIA currently fo-
cuses on labor-intensive enterprises that provide a greater number
of jobs.'6"4 This suits the quest to employ as many inmates as pos-
sible and thereby reduce inmate idleness. The private sector,
however, has turned to high technology, which often requires a
pared-down work force.6 5 As a result of this shift, another PIA
objective-imparting marketable skills to inmates-cannot be
achieved by training prisoners for labor-intensive jobs.
166
The primary emphasis should be on the general financial
benefits of the PIA to Californians.' 67 Currently, financial objec-
tives are third.'6s The PIA seeks
[t]o operate a work program for prisoners which will ul-
timately be self-supporting by generating sufficient funds
from the sale of products and services to pay all the ex-
penses of the program, and one which will provide goods
and services which are or will be used by the Department
of Corrections, thereby reducing the cost of its opera-
tion. 
6 9
In contrast, Florida's prison work program, the Prison Rehabilita-
tive Industries & Diversified Enterprises (PRIDE), derives its
authority from a statute that places its financial goal first: to
"[i]ncrease benefits to the general public by reimbursement to the
state for a portion of the costs of incarceration."' Such a primary
161. See id. at 10.
162. See id.
163. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 2801 (West Supp. 1996); supra notes 110-11 and ac-
companying text.
164. See CARSON, supra note 1, at 10.
165. See id. at 10 (noting that high technology is a labor-saving enterprise).
166. See id.
167. See generally CARSON, supra note 1, at 16 (listing financial self-sufficiency as
one of its top two reform goals).
168. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 2801(c).
169. Id.
170. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 946.006(3)(a) (West 1996). In the early 1980s Florida cre-
ated PRIDE, a private, nonprofit organization, which has been lauded for its self-
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emphasis on reducing the public's financial burden will attract
more legislative and popular support.
17 1
Lauding the rehabilitative effects of the PIA inevitably at-
tracts criticism from the "lock 'em up and throw away the key"
school of punishment. But every key that the state throws away is
costly, and taxpayers directly bear this burden.17 ' By refining the
focus of the PIA mission to stress the benefits to the public in
terms of reductions in cost and future crime, the concept of work-
ing inmates becomes more attractive and practical.
Given the current environment, a financially ambitious and
customer-oriented approach-rather than one focused on maxi-
mizing the number of working inmates-may sustain the PIA over
time without the state's financial support.173 The statute does em-
brace a financial mission. To effectuate financial goals, the state
has wisely chosen an objective "[t]o create and maintain working
conditions within the enterprises as much like those which prevail
in private industry as possible, to assure prisoners employed
therein the opportunity to work productively, to earn funds, and to
acquire or improve effective work habits and occupational
skills.'"74 This reflects a commitment to preparing inmates for
working lives outside of prison.
The PIA's goals must also reflect administrative objectives of
encouraging efficient prison management and minimizing prison
disturbances. 5 Although California hires more than 22,000 men
sufficiency, thrifty management, effectiveness in teaching usable job skills to inmates,
and contribution to a reduced recidivism rate. See Pat Flynn, Prisoner Industries Un-
chained in Florida, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 12, 1996, at Al. As of June 1996
PRIDE ran 41 industry facilities and 12 operations facilities; and as of June 1995 it
employed 2480 inmates, approximately 4.1% of Florida's inmate population. See
AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 89, at E-3.
171. Because Californians have overwhelmingly supported tough crime laws and
policies, see discussion supra Part II.A, an appeal to the rehabilitative potential of a
program simply is not likely to garner the support that a financially promising pro-
gram would. But because financial and rehabilitative results are wholly dependent
on each other, semantics will determine how much support legislators and the public
will give the PIA.
172. See CALIFORNIA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 2, at 160 (listing taxes as
the largest source of revenue to the state annually).
173. See AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 89, at VI-2. Though the PIA may break
even on paper, the hidden costs-such as forcing other state agencies to pay higher
than market prices for goods-may push the tolerance and support of the PIA sup-
porters.
174. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2801(b).
175. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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and women to run its state correctional facilities,'1 7 its statute
mentions nothing about achieving any administrative objectives.'"
Florida wisely states in its second objective that correctional work
programs are designed to "[p]rovide purposeful work for inmates
as a means of reducing tensions caused by overcrowding. 17 1 This
goal reflects respect for the difficult task of running prisons and an
appreciation for the prison staff.
The statutory language of the PIA should also reflect a com-
mitment to helping released inmates find a working life. Released
inmates face bleak job prospects.'79 The legislative history of the
PIA lists "post-release job placement" as one of the elements of
reintegrating ex-offenders into the outside working population.'8
Florida's statute incorporates this critical final step of job place-
ment in its correctional work program objectives, instructing the
Department of Corrections to develop "[a] logical sequence of vo-
cational training, employment by the correctional work programs,
and postrelease job placement for inmates."' 8' By expressly man-
dating that the PIA establish a process of providing skilled inmates
with at least modest prospects of finding a job, the CDC is bound
to see fewer of those inmates return to prison.
2. Privatize or not?
Statutory language suggests that the PIA should operate
similar to a private business and even contains provisions that
would leave the PIA's authority unfettered by the traditional, pro-
cedural requirements of the civil service system.' Despite this
statutory intent, just before the PIA started its operation, the state
personnel board stated that the civil service requirements of the
California Constitution superseded the PIA statute.'" In all prac-
ticality, this suppressed the PIA's autonomy in non-inmate per-
sonnel matters; now it must acquire personnel approval from the
176. See Vellinga, supra note 5, at A15.
177. Overall, the state is very generous toward its CDC workers. California cor-
rectional officers are paid 56% more than their counterparts nationally. See id.
178. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 946.006(3)(b).
179. See Jacobs, supra note 9, at B5 (noting that a convicted felon who obtains a
job will face a drop in earnings, and commenting that a drop in wages directly corre-
lates to a higher tendency to resume criminal activity).
180. See 1982 Cal. Stat. ch. 1549, § 3(d), at 6034.
181. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 946.007(5).
182. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 2808 (providing that "[t]he board shall ... do all the
things which the board of directors of a private corporation would do").
183. See CARSON, supra note 1, at 12.
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Department of Personnel Administration.' 84 Dependence on an-
other department blunts the PIA's entrepreneurial edge. 8 These
constraints limit the PIA's
ability to hire, fire, and reassign staff with the skills it
needs in a rapidly changing business environment. [The
constraints] also frustrat[e] efforts to implement a pay-
for-performance salary structure. The BSA has estimated
that some civil service workers at the PIA earn 30 percent
more than their private-sector counterparts.
86
Several other state government sectors control aspects of PIA op-
erations as well. State procurement processes require that the PIA
route purchase orders through the state's Department of General
Services, a bureaucratic exercise in paperwork that can take from
three to nine months.' T In addition, the CDC internal committees
and security personnel-rather than the PIA-make the ultimate
hiring decisions.' The PIA sets academic and work experience
requirements for many of its positions while the CDC carefully
identifies individuals who pose a security risk.'89 Although security
is crucial to a productive work environment, providing the PIA
with information and then vesting the PIA with final hiring deci-
sions would align it more closely with a private business, where a
single authority is ultimately responsible for all aspects of the
business.'90
The PIA presently functions as a semi-autonomous state
agency.' Whether privatization is the next logical step for the
PIA is a subject of great debate. Proponents of privatization argue
that it facilitates achievement of PIA's original statutory objective
of a self-sufficient and business-like operation.'92 It would mini-
mize the operational and governmental constraints impeding the
PIA,'93 and a profit-oriented, entrepreneurial culture would attract
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. Id. at 12-13.
187. See id. at 13.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 12-13.
190. Since the cost of disorder on the factory floor is so great to the PIA, it will
not be inclined to hire an inmate who has a history of violence simply because that
person has some job skills or experience.
191. See CARSON, supra note 1, at 7.
192 See id. at 1 (recommending privatization).
193. See id.
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a larger pool of potential non-inmate workers.9 4 A privatized PIA
could streamline its personnel and accounting departments,
thereby avoiding the costly and time-consuming requirements of
the Department of Personnel Administration and Department of
General Services. 95
Several hurdles render privatization an impractical alterna-
tive. Privatization would require extensive rewriting of the appli-
cable statutes. Further, it is risky for the state to relinquish a great
deal of control.' 96 PRIDE is the obvious model of a successful pri-
vate, nonprofit organization, but as of June 1995 PRIDE provided
jobs to only 2480 inmates, slightly less than one-third of the num-
ber the PIA employs. 97 Complete failure of a program the size of
the PIA is simply risky.
Inherent characteristics of the PIA labor pool might also sty-
mie privatization efforts. Certainly, cheap labor is a great advan-
tage to the PIA in competing for work. From 1994 to 1995, how-
ever, the PIA lost 1.3 million labor hours-or about 14% of its
total production schedule-due to lock-downs and security prob-
lems.' 9' Not only do lock-downs require that inmates be confined
to their cells, thereby clearing the work floor, but lock-downs often
mean that no vehicles may enter or leave the prison.'" This ham-
pers deliveries and pick-ups in an erratic and time-consuming way
that the private sector neither understands nor appreciates. This
problem is an inherent, permanent cost of running a prison-based
business.
Those who oppose privatization present several alternatives
such as eliminating the PIA Board and making the PIA a division
194. See id. at 17.
195. See id. at 12-13, 18-19.
196. See AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 89, at G-24 (noting that because the PIA
operates in a government setting, it would be impossible for it to run in an entirely
profit-making manner).
197. See id at E-3.
198. See CARSON, supra note 1, at 13 (estimating the loss in sales production to be
about $18.4 million per year). Ironically, stringent security has the unintended,
beneficial effect of essentially eliminating employee theft-a significant problem in
workplaces outside the prison. See LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION, PUTrING
VIOLENCE BEHIND BARS: REDEFINING THE ROLE OF CALIFORNIA'S PRISONS 100
(1994).
199. See generally AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 89, at 10 (listing the need to con-
stantly account for inmate location, to perform standing counts, and to make inmate
searches at various points of ingress and egress as examples of unproductive time);
Frederic M. Biddle, Business Behind Bars, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 3, 1989, at 33
(noting that lock-downs leave trucks stranded outside or inside the prison gates).
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of the CDC, limiting the Board's responsibility, or reforming the
Board.00 A current legislative bill proposes to eliminate the PIA
and reestablish it as a public benefit, tax-exempt, nonprofit corpo-
ration in which the state would maintain a present ownership in-
terest.20'
If the state's goals are to maximize revenue, teach usable
skills, and reduce inmate idleness-all in the shortest amount of
time-maintaining the status of a semi-autonomous state agency is
the most practical alternative. The PIA, however, must have more
freedom to run itself. The PIA needs to have unfettered authority
in several areas to operate most efficiently as the semi-
autonomous state agency intended by the statutory language but
not fully recognized in practice. First, this freedom must include a
clear demarcation of authority. Presently, the PIA General Man-
ager serves under the Board but also reports to the Director of the
CDC, theoretically giving the latter veto power over Board deci-
sions.22 This unclear chain of authority has led to weak internal
governance.20 3 The statutes should be revised to provide the Board
with the final veto. The Board has been given the mandate to run
a successful program, and it must have the power to make deci-
sions to do so.
Presently, Board members are part-time, unsalaried appoint-
ees who meet at least four times a year as required by statute.Y
Board members should receive some type of salary.25 This serves
as a long-overdue compensation for the time Board members
spend, as well as a way to make the job more attractive to people
who have the time and experience to do the job well. Finally, the
Board should meet more regularly to ensure that the PIA is run-
ning smoothly.06
The state has given the Board the heavy task of running a
$152 million-per-year enterprise, yet it has withheld some of the
200. See AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 89, at VI-3 to VI-4.
201. See Prison Industry Authority: Hearing on S.B. 617 Before the Senate Rules
Committee, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. 2-4 (Cal. 1995). The proposal would permit limited
sales to the private sector. See id. This bill incorporates recommendations from the
Legislative Analyst's Office report as well as aspects of prison work program statutes
from other states. See id.
202. See CARSON, supra note 1, at 14.
203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 19.
206. See id.
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necessary tools. Since the Board lacks the resources to properly
evaluate the PIA's success and cannot make final decisions in such
essential areas as hiring, budgets, and proposals, it does not have
adequate control over the PIA .2  This general confusion has led
to a number of problems: too many product lines, excessive inven-
tory and warehouse space, an inadequate system to control prod-
uct costs, and a large number of enterprises running in the red.03
Even proponents of privatization support increased checks
and balances to ensure that the PIA spends its resources efficiently
and strives to fulfill its statutory mandates.2 9 These would include
continuing to provide an annual report to the legislature-though
perhaps one with more detail .
Another important element of financial self-sufficiency is
modification of the requirement that state public agencies buy cer-
tain goods from state prison industries.' Senator Richard Polanco
recently sponsored legislation that addresses this issue.2 '2  Both
Texas and New York governmental agencies are required to pur-
chase products from Texas Correctional Industries (TCI) and Cor-
craft, respectively, but only if the products meet the customer's
207. See id. at 12,14, 19.
208. See AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 89, at 1I-1; CARSON, supra note 1, at 14.
The PIA would benefit tremendously from reengineering. It runs 31 industries and
73 factories while the federal government-employing more than twice the number
of inmates-runs 18 industries and 54 factories. See AUDITOR REPORT, supra note
89, at E-6.
209. See CARSON, supra note 1, at 19.
210. See id. The PIA is already subject to regular state audits. See id. at 5.
211. The following state agencies are required to maximize utilization of PIA
products: the State and Consumer Services Agency; the Business, Transportation
and Housing Agency; the Health and Welfare Agency; the Resources Agency; the
Youth and Adult Correctional Agency; the California Environmental Protection
Agency; the Department of Food and Agriculture; the Attorney General; the Secre-
tary of State; the Treasurer; the Controller; and the Superintendent of Public In-
struction. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 2807 (West 1982 & Supp. 1996).
212. The state legislature recently passed a bill requiring that every contract en-
tered into by a state agency must specify that no foreign goods or equipment be pro-
duced by forced labor. See CAL. PUB. CoNT. CODE § 6108 (West Supp. 1997). This
law is an attempt to provide state enforcement of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of
1930, the federal law that prohibits the importation of any goods made with forced
labor. See 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1994). Critics point out the hypocrisy of condemning
other countries for use of forced labor while requiring that certain agencies purchase
products made in California by prisoners. See Hearing on S.B. 2457 Before the Sen-
ate, 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. 100 (Cal. 1996) available in LEXIS, Statenet Library. This
argument is not persuasive; although this country is limited in how it can monitor
human rights violations in other countries, it has easy access to U.S. prisons.
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price, quality, and delivery standards.2 3 Only certain federal gov-
ernment departments, such as the Department of Defense, Gen-
eral Services Administration, and the Department of Veterans Af-
fairs must purchase products from the federal government's prison214
industry agency, UNICOR. None of Florida's 2government
agencies are required to purchase PRIDE products.2'5- Following
the lead of Texas and New York, California should add the proviso
that the price, quality, and delivery standard of PIA products must
be competitive. This would address the accusations that some PIA
products are shoddy and their delivery times are late.2" Addi-
tionally, the PIA's self-sufficiency claims could not be undermined
by charges that other state agencies are paying the price for the
PIA's bottom line.
3. Compete in the private sector
With products that were competitive in price and quality,
prison industries could make a greater contribution to inmate
workers and state coffers if they could sell prison-made products
213. See AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 89, at E-2, E-4. Texas Correctional Indus-
tries (TCI) employs 7696 inmates, approximately 6.7% of the total Texas inmate
population, at thirty-seven manufacturing facilities and six service facilities. See id.
at E-2. Texas Governor George W. Bush has created a World Wide Web site that
advertises the state's inmate work programs--complete with photographs of inmates
constructing new prisons. See Bush, Bullock Announce Plan to Put Prisoners to
Work Cleaning up Parks; Agreement Worth Millions in Labor (visited Mar. 6, 1997)
<http://www.texas.gov/cemetery/html>.
The New York Department of Correctional Services (DCS), Division of In-
dustries/Corcraft run a more streamlined operation than Texas-fourteen manufac-
turing facilities and two service facilities. See AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 89, at E-
4. Two thousand six hundred inmates, 3.8% of the state's total inmate population,
work for Corcraft. See id.
214. See AUDITOR REPORT, supra note 89, at E-5. Federal Prison Industries, Inc.
(FPI) operates under the trade name UNICOR as a wholly-owned federal govern,
ment corporation. See id. UNICOR runs 54 manufacturing facilities and 17 service
facilities, employing 15,972 inmates, approximately 19% of the total federal inmate
population. See id.
215. See iL at E-3.
216. The Orange County Register conducted a three-month study and found that
the PIA "has a history of providing shoddy, overpriced products." Lifsher, supra
note 58, at 24. "Not one single item in PIA is competitive," stated a longtime busi-
nessman and owner of a Los Angeles-based construction company. Id. The State
Auditor's Office found that in terms of overall satisfaction with the PIA, 9% of cus-
tomers were extremely dissatisfied; 31% were dissatisfied; 30% were not quite satis-
fied; 29% were satisfied; and 1% were extremely satisfied. See AUDITOR REPORT,
supra note 89, at D-4. Seventy-one percent rated PIA's overall performance worse
than other suppliers, while 28% rated it the same, and only 1% rated it better. See
id.
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and services to the private sector. Because organized labor will
object vociferously to this measure, establishing clear rules for fair
competition is integral;217 this means limiting how much the PIA
may infringe upon civilian labor markets. The legislature must set
the amount of allowable infringement, for instance, 5% of the lo-
cal business of a given type. Statutes currently require labor repre-
sentation on the PIA Board and that the Board hold public hear-
ings for persons and companies that might be affected by current
or future plans of the Board.218 The Board would have to continue
to hold these hearings, perhaps monthly, to ensure that the PIA
does not exceed its defined allowance of civilian business.
4. Establish hiring policies that evaluate potential for productivity
and rehabilitation
The PIA and CDC must establish policies on how to select
inmates who satisfy certain criteria: who are best suited for the
work; who have enough sentence left to serve so that the enter-
prise is able to harvest the fruits of trained labor; and who seem in-
tent on putting their skills to work on the outside.
The PIA workforce has a turnover rate of 145% per year, sug-
gesting that the CDC is assigning jobs to inmates who have little
time left to serve.219 The prison pool presents the PIA with many
inmates who need to be trained from scratch2 ° Investing expen-
sive and time-intensive training in inmates only to lose them be-
fore they can work productively is a frustrating endeavor. Though
it may satisfy one PIA goal-preparing prisoners for jobs on the
outside-it makes the goal of self-sufficiency impossible.
Conversely, the PIA must be wary of hiring inmates who have
too much time left to serve.22' A Texas senate committee proposal
217. See Biddle, supra note 199, at 38.
218. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2802(f), 2808(i).
219. See CARSON, supra note 1, at 13.
220. See id.
221. As more criminals sentenced under the "three strikes" law enter the system
for long periods of time, the pool of inmates with only a few years left on their sen-
tences decreases. See supra note 11 for a discussion of the "three strikes" law. An-
other inevitable problem with the increasing number of second- and third-strike of-
fenders is that the population of older inmates will burgeon. Studies disagree on
what age defines "elder." See Ronald H. Aday, Golden Years Behind Bars: Special
Programs and Facilities for Elderly Inmates, 58 FED. PROBATION 47, 48 (1994)
(noting that authors define elder as 50 to 65 and older). Studies generally agree,
however, that vocational and work programs are not intended to benefit elder in-
mates. See id. at 53 (noting that since long-term, older offenders are not likely to
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heavily concentrates the state's rehabilitative efforts on people
who are within two years of their release date. m2 The chair of the
committee, State Representative Allen Hightower, commented
that "[e]xperience has shown that [convicts] don't gain too much
from the [rehabilitation] programs until they can see the light at
the end of the tunnel-when they get near the end of their sen-
tence. So why spend a lot of money on people when it won't
help?" '
5. Gradually expand the PIA program to involve more inmates
Despite the modest success of the program, the PIA should
expand carefully. Theoretically, if more inmates learn skills, the
recidivism rate will drop, and California's taxpayers will spend less
on prisons. Though this intention is good, simply demanding an
expansion and tossing money to the CDC ignores significant struc-
tural obstacles. The PIA must expand in conjunction with a num-
ber of fundamental changes such as those suggested in this Com-
ment. Expansion would be a natural and healthy consequence of
these recommendations.
A pending state bill would require that the CDC "develop a
plan to enable every eligible inmate to participate in a work, edu-
cational, or rehabilitation program by the year 2000.' ,224 The bill
would limit CDC expenditures for development of the program to
$100,000.22 The impetus for the bill was a report issued by the
Little Hoover Commission entitled Putting Violence Behind Bars:
Redefining the Role of California's Prisons.26  The report
prompted the legislative declaration that inmates "should work as
hard as the taxpayers who provide for their upkeep."' ' 7
return to the workforce, these programs serve no purpose); Jason S. Ornduff, Releas-
ing the Elderly Inmate: A Solution to Prison Overcrowding, 4 ELDER L.J. 173, 184
(1996) (finding that prison staff discourages elderly inmates from participating in
such programs and reserves them for younger inmates).
222. See Ward, supra note 102, at Al. Careful selection of program participants
with a short time left to serve clearly eliminates a substantial number of inmates.
Those who are serving life terms-the ones who face the most idleness and least
hope-are not good candidates for the PIA programs. The CDC, however, runs a
number of vocational and educational programs, which might be better suited to
these types of offenders. See CARSON, supra note 1, at 5 fig.3 (listing the work and
educational programs sponsored by the Department of Corrections).
223. Ward, supra note 102, at Al.
224. A.B. 344, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995).
225. See id.
226. LITTLE HOOVER COMMISSION, supra note 198.
227. A.B. 344, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1995).
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Although its intentions are sensible, this bill was hastily con-
ceived. The CDC has 19,000 inmates eligible for work, but it faces
three massive obstacles: deficient staffing and equipment at state
prisons, security concerns due to construction design, and gross
overcrowding.m The CDC estimates the cost of addressing the
first two obstacles at $55 million.229 The third obstacle is a tricky
paradox. On one hand, the state can only reduce overcrowding by
decreasing recidivism. On the other hand, the state cannot reduce
recidivism because the current overcrowding prevents the state
from providing a safe and productive atmosphere where it can
teach skills that lead to reduced recidivism. Expansion must be an
overall objective in prison work programs, but the solution is a
more serious and well-conceived investment in the CDC.
6. Measure mission performance
The most effective way to evaluate whether the prison work
programs have imparted useful skills to released inmates is to
track recidivism rates carefully. Neither the PIA nor the CDC can
provide any data on these rates for PIA workers 30 No agency has
tracked whether PIA enterprises are more effective at reducing
recidivism rates than other prison work and educational pro-
231
Because the PIA provides work to only 5.5% of the total
prison population, its impact on the overall recidivism rate is
probably negligible. 3 2 Yet the state's operational cost of a second-
strike offender returning as a third-striker with a mandatory mini-
mum twenty-five year sentence is at least $428,000, not including
an average of $124,000 to build a prison cell for such a high-
security criminal. 33 Even modestly reducing the number of third-
strike offenders would significantly reduce the CDC budget.
Florida statutorily requires that the Department of Corrections es-
tablish procedures to evaluate whether work programs are related
to successful post-release adjustments.34 The recidivism rate of
workers in Florida's PRIDE program is 15% over four years,
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See CARSON, supra note 1, at 12.
231. See id.
232 See id. at 10. Approximately 110,000 inmates are released on parole each
year. See id. at 12.
233. See id. at 12.
234. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 946.009(2)(a) (West 1996).
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compared with 51% for Florida's general inmate population.23' By
tracking recidivism rates, California could set realistic goals for re-
ducing recidivism and offer incentives to non-inmate prison work-
ers to achieve these objectives.
IV. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most ominous aspect of the escalating growth of
California's correctional system is that it shows no sign of stopping.
Slowing this train does not necessitate that the state abandon its
"tough on crime" policies. It does require, however, an investment
in presenting alternatives to crime and harvesting the fruits of the
labor force the state has at its disposal.
Almost 60% of inmates in California prisons have been be-
hind bars before.236 They must have received little guidance while
incarcerated on viable alternatives to a life of crime. The PIA is a
manageable program through which the state can achieve its ob-
jective of providing these alternatives. Through streamlining and
slow expansion, the PIA can generate more released inmates who
are armed, not with weapons and a bad attitude, but with the
practical skills and experience necessary to succeed in a lawful pro-
fession. This outcome achieves the rehabilitative and restorative
objectives to reform criminals into productive members of society.
The icing on the cake is that the state can reap a number of
other benefits while rehabilitating its inmates. Financially, the
PIA should be able to support itself and gradually become a fi-
nancially successful enterprise. Though generally it is an unfortu-
nate fact, the PIA is not limited by its labor force. As steadily as it
can effectively train and release one inmate, another can move
into the vacated slot. Administratively, a well-run PIA ensures a
more peaceful inmate population, thereby creating a less stressful
and violent environment for those who work for the CDC and the
inmates who reside in prison.
Finally, the public's desire for punishment is not compro-
mised. The state will still send criminals to prison for long sen-
tences, thereby providing comfort to society. Comfort, however,
has a cost. Are Californians willing to simply write a blank check?
The number of programs that the state will have to cut or sacrifice
235. See CARSON, supra note 1, at 15-16; see also supra note 85 and accompanying
text (discussing studies on the impact of work programs on recidivism rates).
236. See Proposal, supra note 10, at 6.
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to support prison expansion is unknown. Certainly, it will be large.
The magnitude of tax increases that the state may have to levy is
also unpredictable. In the absence of real and immediate changes,
however, the inevitability of program cuts and tax increases is
clear. The PIA provides a remarkably practical and creative
means of cutting the cost while the state still can.
*Lisa C. Phelan
* I warmly thank the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Re-
view for their creative and meticulous help. Associate Dean Laurie Levenson, Alicia
Moretti, and, especially, Jay Phelan deserve special gratitude for their inspiration
and assistance.
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